Spring 2007, Vol. 4, Issue 1

Enriched uranium activities get STAMMP of approval

Automated reconciliation of material transfers is being evaluated. Click image for larger view.

Y‑12 must continue to meet mission deliverables for the production and refurbishment of weapon components and the storage of nuclear material, even with ongoing modernization projects. The Storage, Tracking, and Material Movement Program — or STAMMP — is focused on upgrading Y‑12's fissile material movement process. Objectives include improving the conduct of operations, simplifying material movement and evaluating uniform container loading limits. Safety-related controls are also being addressed, and the program provides security benefits through the enhanced tracking as well.

Y‑12's Storage, Tracking, and Material Movement Program, or STAMMP, strengthens on-site enriched uranium storage and tracking.

“Maintaining proper configuration for criticality safety is a priority,” said project engineer Jeff Coppala, who noted that in the past, required information wasn't always physically with every enriched uranium storage container at Y‑12. Now, however, an American National Standards Institute–compliant card must be affixed to shipments of enriched uranium. The new cards provide information to the operator handling the material.

In addition, Coppala and other STAMMP team members are interested in improving the tracking and automation of material movement. Enriched uranium stored at Y‑12 is currently tracked through a system that reads bar codes on containers. Bar code readers feed databases that are Y‑12's material inventory and track the precise location of material as it is moved. “For example,” he explained, “if there is a bar code on a stapler, readers at office doors would track the stapler's location as it is moved from one office to another. You would know that at 8:05 a.m. the stapler left room 101 and at 8:15 a.m. it entered room 102.”

However, Coppala pointed out that bar codes have limits. “They only provide a snapshot in time,” he said. “They do not provide continuous or current status.”

The STAMMP team is evaluating the use of active radio frequency identification tags as an additional strategy to enhance and simplify material movement at Y‑12. RFID tags would provide a continuous status for material stored at the site. Current applications of active RFID technology include asset tracking, wireless telecommunications and electronic toll booth collection.

Another option under evaluation would address the inconsistent loading limits at the Y‑12 National Security Complex. “A container in Building A may have a 10-kg loading limit, in Building B the same container may have a 7-kg loading limit, and in Building C the same container may have a 5-kg limit,” explained Coppala. “If Y‑12 went to a uniform system, the container would use the lowest limit — in this example 5 kg.” An impact assessment is under way to identify the costs and benefits of implementing uniform loading limits among buildings at Y‑12.

STAMMP is expected to be fully operational for loading the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility. “There won't be any legacy issues with the material going into HEUMF,” said Coppala. “We are data mining now so we can fully populate the WorkStream and Dynamic Special Nuclear Materials and Control Accountability System databases.” With the transition to HEUMF, material transfers and reconciliation of paperwork will be automated.

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